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'Economics of Cybersecurity' should thus constitute a significant part of the Information Security Posture 
Assessment process and should be directly addressed in this context. As the complexity and interdependency of 
Information Systems augments and new technologies lead to the de-materialization of Information Systems assets, 
it becomes progressively evident that the conflicting interests and incentives of the various stakeholders of an 
Information System affect its overall Information Security Posture, perhaps even more significantly than technical 
or policy limitations do. This paper examines economic considerations from an Information Systems 
Security/Cybersecurity viewpoint and proposes new directions that may both help reduce the problem from a 
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Introduction 
It is a generally accepted truth that Information Security (IS) costs money. There are inherent costs  in  all  aspects  
involved  in  the  mitigation of  the  risks  relevant  to  IS,  such  as  the technology used, required procedures, 
statutory compliance, awareness education, etc. The same holds true for Information System Security, or 
Cybersecurity, which is the IS subset that deals with Information Systems aspects of IS (what used to be known as 
'computer security'). The expenditure for IS has been steadily increasing over the past years, following the increase 
in emerging Cybersecurity threats as it has been established in the recently released 'The Global State of 
Information Security® Survey for 2014' (PwC 2013b). The 'Emerging Threats' versus 'Cybersecurity initiatives' 
race is being viewed as the modern cold war face-off, which is constantly fuelled by large numbers of emerging 
threats as categorically shown in the ENISA Threat Landscape 2013 report (ENISA 2013). Unfortunately, it may 
well be that even though IS expenditure increases, it does not do so at a rate capable of efficiently counteracting the 
emerging threats. Furthermore, the attackers are no longer lone hackers driven by personal agendas, but there may 
well be criminal organisations or even nations behind cyber- offensives. 
 
The ugly truth is that this 'war' is definitely asymmetric, as the attackers have many weapons in their arsenal and 
attacks can be mounted with low cost, compared to the possible gain stemming  from  a  successful  attack.  On  
the  contrary,  regarding  the  defensive  side,  any 'Cybersecurity initiative' faces the real risk of becoming a 
bottomless money-pit or, if funding is prematurely curtailed, of not being able to justify its existence, and, even 
worse, of potentially providing a false sense of security to the defending force. In the preface to their book titled 
‘Foundations of Information Security: Based on ISO27001 & ISO27002’, Hintzbergen et al. (2010) make 
reference to the Great Wall of China as the ultimate example of the effort towards physical security and the 
effect of physical security in modern-day IS. The Great Wall of China, and fortress walls in general, are 
indeed very popular examples used in the IS literature (Groom 2003) from which analogies are drawn (for 
example, Bastion hosts and Gateway servers). However, the Great Wall of China can also be used to 
  
 
demonstrate the asymmetry of cyberwar. The Great Wall was built at great expense and effort, yet it  too 
had vulnerable points, partly due to terrain and partly due to the limitations in its construction.  A single 
well-targeted attack against the wall could result in a breach, and thus the cost of intrusion would be negligible 
compared to the total cost of construction and maintenance of the Great Wall. 
 
It is thus not unfitting to draw analogies from this example for the Cybersecurity paradigm, whereby the 
equivalent 'Great Wall' is constructed of a plethora of technical measures, supported by policies and procedures. 
The problem, though, frequently lies in the 'brick and mortar' of this construct and manifests itself in the form of 
hastily produced and inadequately debugged software that, when integrated in the wall-building effort, comes 
with inherent defects and weaknesses. This is usually caused by the desire of software houses to minimise the 
time-to-market of a new product and to maximise the profit on the relevant investment. Other problems with the 
'construction material' of the 'wall' may result from choices made by the defending champions regarding the 
selection and integration of security-crucial components which  are,  once  more,  influenced by  financial  
considerations. Furthermore, insofar as policies and procedures are concerned, they, too, are governed by direct 
financial decisions as well as by indirect ones, such as those that are related to productivity, financial risk, 
reputation issues, etc. Hence, financial decisions made within the boundaries of an organisation increasingly 





Vulnerabilities Induced by Economic Considerations 
Economic considerations are being used in the process of risk assessment, usually to define an 
organisation's 'risk appetite' and to lead to informed decisions regarding the implementation of security measures. 
Even though there is nothing intrinsically wrong with this procedure, which does indeed produce valid 
results, perhaps a change of paradigm is in order: the economic considerations themselves should form part of the 
threat landscape that needs to be examined in the context of a risk assessment. In such an approach, economic 
considerations will not only function as the yardstick against which every type of risk and its compensatory 
measures are benchmarked, but they, too, will come under scrutiny and evaluation. In the following sections, an 
effort is made to bring to light a number of economic considerations that give rise to vulnerabilities or may even 
be themselves identified as vulnerabilities for IS. The question that needs to be addressed is whether and to what 
extent the economic considerations that may seem justified from the Management's point-of-view adversely 
affect IS, and Cybersecurity in particular, and if these can be somehow controlled. 
 
Diverging incentives and holes-in-the-wall 
It was already mentioned that the defensive wall that organisations are trying to build around 
their information assets may be undermined by the different incentives of the organisation and of the software and 
hardware vendors. One such difference may indeed be the fact that software vendors are commonly more 
concerned with the production of buyer-acceptable software at minimum cost  and  with  minimal time-to-
market, rather than with the effort towards the security of their product (Anderson & Moore 2006) which is 
usually exhausted at the lowest obligatory level prescribed by regulatory compliance (Shostack & Stewart 2008). It 
is interesting that, in this day and age, software houses still shy away from assuming any of the risk stemming 
from the use of their products (Marotta-Wurgler 2007 & 2011). In order to use the software, clients have to 
accept disclaimers that minimise or even eliminate the liability of the software producer/vendor. Effectively, 
as Bessey et al. (2010) put it: “Indifference can arise from lack of accountability”. 
 
However, even though users may like the idea of secure software, they can neither really tell the difference 
between secure and insecure software nor are they inclined to pay for better- written software. Thus, because of 
competition, the costly effort that goes into the production of secure software cannot be adequately compensated 
for (Anderson & Moore 2006). This, in turn,  makes  it  difficult  for  software  houses  to  allocate  funding  and  
resources  for  the production of secure software. If software security were somehow enforced (for example 
through legal/regulatory compliance to appropriate standards and practices), software would probably cost 
significantly more than it does today. The problem of diverging incentives between the software houses and their 
ultimate clients becomes even more serious if stories, such as the one reported by Reuters (2013) exposing a 
secret $10 million contract between RSA and NSA, prove to be true. If products by Information Security giants 
that are used by hundreds of software producers and service providers are tainted in the manner reported by 
Reuters, then innumerable end-users ranging from individuals to corporate and governmental entities and to 
international organisations, are adversely and grossly affected. 
 
Upgrading towards greater risk 
The function of Information Systems in a constantly changing landscape of emerging threats 
requires systematic updates in order to maintain an acceptable level of Cybersecurity. Continuous updating is in 
part necessitated by initial inadequate debugging of software code. Hence, updates become tools for fixing bugs 
  
 
and addressing security liabilities during the production phase of software (Brown 2005). Complete debugging 
becomes virtually impossible given the complexity of the code and the constraints imposed on software 
production by economic considerations. It is also assumed that once a 'patch' is applied in 
order to control an existing shortcoming in the code or to provide new functionality, the additional code may 
itself have new and different shortcomings that create new vulnerabilities to be addressed and so on. However, it 
is reasonable to assume that with every iteration of the update process, the software tends asymptotically to a 
state of higher security that should eventually -- ceteris paribus -- lead to a higher level of Cybersecurity. 
Unfortunately, all other things do not remain constant, and 'new and improved' versions of the software, 
inescapably give rise to a myriad of new vulnerabilities. 
 
In practice, even if not required or requested by the customer, the upgrade to the new version of the software is 
compulsory--usually at significant cost--as support for previous versions is discontinued eventually and thus they 
become obsolete. The new versions, in order to provide increased functionality that appeals to the customer, are 
always more complex, and have more lines  of  code  and  thus  include more  bugs,  effectively feeding the  
vicious  cycle  of  the continual struggle towards Cybersecurity. The paradox of this situation is that the end-
user invariably uses only a small fraction of the software's full functionality. By trying to address the differing 
individual needs of their clientele all at once, the software producers create coding behemoths that are 
impossible to contain from a security perspective. The end result is that the customers are forced to accept 
increasingly expensive and at the same time more vulnerable software that requires a larger number of more 
expensive controls. Hence, software becomes more expensive and less secure. 
 
Who decides on what matters 
At the foundation of every Risk Assessment project lies the valuation of assets. This is 
necessary in order to establish controls that are commensurate with the asset value. Asset valuation is rarely 
a simple task and it becomes increasingly complicated given the pervasive nature of Information Technology 
and the maze of interdependencies between business functions and assets.  In an organisational structure, the 
obligation for an authoritative opinion on information asset valuation lies with the business owners of the 
information assets, although it is usually the Information Technology department which is responsible for the 
actual security of the assets. Clearly, the views that the two groups take on the same assets are from radically 
different perspectives and, hence, the resulting opinions and argument lines are usually quite different. In a 
context of cutbacks and limited resources, 'efficient' governance may call for a 'relaxed' view on the value of a 
particular asset to the business, with the ultimate goal of keeping the relevant security budget in check. Such an 
attitude may cause serious problems in the function of the IT department that will simply not have the means to 
adequately care for the security of the information assets it is entrusted with. Thus, an organisational strategy 
which only looks at the 'bottom-line' may create latent security issues that will eventually undermine the 
Information Security structure as a whole, due to the interdependencies between information assets and business 
functions. Better communication between the different groups within an organisation may help in the direction 
of more accurate asset valuation, but, again, this may prove to be ineffective as  it is commonplace for  
executives in general and Information Security executives in particular to be required 'to do more with less' 
(Johnson & Goetz 2007).   
 
In a business context of limited financial resources, the pressure on employees of all levels to perform beyond 
  
 
what can be reasonably expected from them serves as a negative influence on their acts and decisions, especially 
those related to Information Security which is usually viewed in an oversimplified manner. Research carried out 
by Albrechtsen and Hovden (2009) further shows that different groups within an information-handling structure 
perceive matters differently, thus leading to misconceptions about Information Security and to a lack of common 
understanding of Information Security and Information Assurance concepts. Furthermore, in the context of 
austerity, the ever-present problems in communication and understanding between groups of stakeholders of the 
same organisational structure, as identified by Berger and Luckmann (1991), become more prominent, in 
effect leading to a breakdown of communications between the different groups of stakeholders. Thus the lack of 
common understanding between Information Security managers and everyone else in the Organisation (possibly 
including those responsible for information asset valuation) combined with the aggravated difficulties of 
communication between groups, makes it difficult to accurately set the true value of information assets to the 
organisation. 
 
To complicate the issue even further, as the attack vectors against information resources continually evolve and 
become more elaborate, perhaps it is the exploitation value that an information asset potentially holds for an 
attacker that must be examined, along with its obvious business value. If, for example, the comparative values of 
an organisation's customer database versus its employee database are examined (the sensitive personal data 
protection regulatory compliance notwithstanding), from a business point of view it is the customer database 
which is more important and thus warrants stricter (and more expensive) protective measures. Hence, a higher 
budget will be allocated for the security of the customer database rather than for the employee database. From the 
attacker's side though, the employee database may be very attractive and may have a very high exploitation value 
as a means to successful attacks against other assets of the organisation. Viewed from that angle, a high security 
budget may also be justified for the protection of the seemingly business-wise inconsequential employee 
database. 
 
Productivity versus Security 
Information  Systems  Security/Cybersecurity  measures  are  often  seen  as  inhibitors  of 
productivity. This may manifest itself at the user level where, for example, USB port deactivation or the 
necessity for many and complex passwords may cost time and effort on the part of the user. Hence, the user may 
feel that this is a waste of resources that reduces his or her productivity and eventually the profits of the 
business. When this view is shared by the management (after all, managers are usually also users of the same 
Information System), then:  
a) at a critical time management might directly or indirectly force the users or even IT administrators to break 
away from the Information Security Policy (ISP) and circumvent the controls in order 'to get the work done' (the 
image of a CEO wielding a tablet and asking IT people to connect it to the network despite ISP provisions, does 
spring to mind), or 
 
b) management might oppose the inclusion of controls that might feel counter-productive  and thus financially 
unwise-- in the ISP, effectively undermining the Cybersecurity effort. This is corroborated by the findings of 
Rainer et al. (2007) where the list of top issues that Information Security professionals have difficulty 





Moving away from the 'Moat & Castle' cybersecurity model 
Pfleeger (1997) used a medieval analogy of a castle surrounded by a moat in order to explain 
the idea of 'defence-in-depth' in Information System Security. This has been and still is the model through which 
most information assets are protected. However, in the interest of enhanced productivity, which directly translates 
to profit maximisation, business management continually requests greater availability of information assets, 
irrespective of the geographic 
location of users and time-of-day. From low-end IT users to business managers, we are all enticed by the 
flexibility and mobility that technological solutions provide for our everyday lives and we are willing to 
sacrifice large parts of our privacy and right to confidentiality in order  to  keep  enjoying this  maximised 
availability of  information. Being  accepted at  a personal level, this model is then unreservedly requested for 
the management of professional information by turning a blind eye to the extended security requirements that 
apply to this type of information. In order to provide such services and to facilitate relatively new and 
'financially sensible' notions such as 'Bring Your Own Device' (BYOD) and the use of the Cloud, 
Information Systems have to move away from the Pfleeger 'Moat & Castle' paradigm and, in the attempt to 
remain secure, confront a huge set of new threats. It could be argued that this is evolution and progress and that 
it should not be hindered but, instead, adaptation is in order. However, recent history has shown that the move 
towards new technologies is anything but systematic and controlled as far as the security of these new 
technological solutions is concerned (GIT 2013). On the contrary, technical solutions are proposed and adopted 
on short-term and immediately visible economic merits--or the expectation thereof before the degree of their 
security resilience is even established, which can lead to great loss, financial and otherwise, during their 
maturation. Typically, even though we are being taught that security considerations for a proposed solution 
should begin at the time of its conception, the fact remains that most of the IT industry generally works under the 
principle of putting a new product out for sale as quickly as possible and worrying about its security 
parameters later. Thus, we find ourselves stepping outside the relatively secure perimeter defined by the 
'Moat & Castle' in order to gather larger crops, without having first ensured that we have a fighting chance 
against an enemy attack. 
 
Outsourcing and expansion: can Information Security levels be sustained? 
In current times of globalisation and a continual search for the competitive edge, business 
choices  often  call  for  outsourcing  of  information-related  services  to  third  parties  and expansion of the 
business on its own means or through partnerships. Such business choices are usually made without prior 
investigation of the new security risks that they may be causing (Johnson & Goetz 2007). To use the Great 
Wall of China example, in time of rapid territorial expansion, the frontier line quickly grows in length, without a 
strong wall to protect it  against  attacks.  Defending  that  line  is  probably  the  most  difficult  task  following  
an expansive campaign. Hence, for businesses, the challenge is to follow the prescribed business plan, without 
losing control of the information assets of the business and without compromising the assets’ security. 
Additionally, the challenge becomes even greater when expansion includes acquisitions or makes systems 
accessible by external partners (Johnson & Goetz 2007). When outsourcing information-related services to third 
parties, the utmost care must be taken, as third-party organisational structures are not necessarily permeated 
by the same Cybersecurity mentality of the outsourcing organisation, and they might not share the same values. 
Auditing or random checks of the third-party procedures and practices by the outsourcer are usually out of 
  
 
the question, so the cooperation between the two parties is simply governed by an agreement which 
addresses Information Security issues as a subset of a more general context and even prescribes penalties in case 
of non-compliance.  If the common Cybersecurity effort is exhausted at that level, it is quite possible that 
trouble will not be avoided and all action will be retroactive, following a security event. Following a common 
rule, such as the one set by the ISO/IEC 27000 series standards, thus becomes of paramount importance for 
cooperation. This common alignment must be promoted both by the  appropriate legal  and  regulatory 
framework  as  well  as  by  generally acceptable best business practices. 
 
To be or not to be (secure)? 
In the various certification programs for Information Security professionals (as in ISACA 
2011) it is taught that the effort towards Information Security should function as a business enabler by a) being 
aligned with business goals and objectives, b) ensuring regulatory compliance, and c) reducing risk to an 
acceptable level. These are valid working hypotheses, as, indeed, overspending on Information Security would 
be unwise and would have adverse effects on the 'bottom line' of the business. In this sense, several spending 
models and investment approaches for Information Security have been developed (as in Gordon & Loeb 
2002; Cavusoglu, Mishra & Raghunathan 2004; Tsiakis & Stephanides 2005; Böhme 2010, etc). It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to compare and to analyse Information Security spending models and a very 
extensive bibliography exists on the subject. However, despite the outcome of a model-based expenditure 
analysis--with all of its merits and shortcomings-- the ultimate business decision on information security must be 
aligned with the core business objective and it must be made by people whose roles are closer to management 
than to Information Security. Schroeder and Grimaila (2006) showed that there is definite bias in the decision-
making process regarding Information Security and that the decision-makers “will place more weight on 
operational outcomes than security outcomes”. Thus, even if security considerations are against the operation of a 
system, the decision-makers are perfectly capable of ignoring that outcome, simply because the business 
impact of not having the system in operation is greater than allowing it to function without sufficient security. If 
such economics- based decisions are abused, they will significantly raise the organisation's risk appetite and 
undermine its Cybersecurity posture. 
 
Regulatory provisions as an excuse 
Apart from business alignment and acceptable risk, as examined above, there is also the issue of regulatory 
compliance. It is evident that defensive action in Cybersecurity always comes as 
a result of an exploited vulnerability. Strictly speaking, pro-active cyberdefence--in the exact 
meaning of the term--is not really possible. Most cyberdefence measures are thus one step behind the 
respective threats in this continual tug-o-war. To make matters worse, for such a measure to be included in a 
regulatory compliance document, even more time has to pass. It is thus only reasonable to conclude that 
regulatory provisions only cater for 'yesterday's problems'. This is no secret among serious Information Security 
professionals, and thus regulatory compliance is, by default, considered inadequate in real Information Security 
and Cybersecurity terms. On the other hand, regulatory compliance gives a golden excuse to Management to 
limit Information Security expenditure because it simply allows the tick-off of another checkbox in a financially 
justified 'to do' list, without effectively addressing the underlying security issue (Shostack & Stewart 2008). 
 
A cloudy future 
  
 
While the move towards the cloud does seem to have some obvious financial advantages, the 
cloud still remains a very unsafe place for storing information (GIT 2013). Furthermore it constitutes an 
example of how large IT vendors use their market penetration to further shape the market (and its security) 
according to their interests. The degree of success of a Cloud service provider depends on the provider's 
ability to create service capacity at a much larger scale  than  any  individual  organisation  could  manage  and  
then  sell  it  back  to  the  user piecewise at a gain, but at a much lower cost than the user could manage 
alone (Kushida, Murray, & Zysman 2011). In order to attract customers quickly, the major cloud service 
providers created a very attractive but quite unsafe environment. According to the Georgia Institute of 
Technology “Emerging cyber threats report 2014” (GIT 2013), for data to be moved to the cloud there must be 
trade-offs between security and usability as “File sharing 
and other cloud services still have questionable security”. The report identifies three key issues that, 
despite all predictions to the contrary, persist: a) business data is moved to the cloud protected only by the 
security measures provided by the cloud storage firm, b) private- key encryption is not used, as storing 
encrypted data in the cloud drastically reduces the cloud's  utility,  and  c)  the  use  of  searchable  encryption  
necessitates  trade-offs  between security, functionality, and efficiency. Yet, even though security is all but non-
existent in the cloud, companies and organisations exhibit a huge appetite for risk by deciding to keep using it, 
obviously basing their decision on financial merits alone. Even hardware methods of controlling who has access 
to cloud data and where data is stored, through the use of Trusted Platform Modules or 'TPM' as described by 
Krauss and Fusenig (2013), may be insufficient, as even these most secure Integrated Circuits (ICs) have been 
reported to succumb to physical attacks using acid, rust remover, a lot of time, and a lot of skill (Tarnovsky 
2008). As TPM ICs are used in many sensitive applications such as secure communications, military systems, 
and the like, it is conceivable that if enough money and resources are allocated to the effort, a great deal of secrets 
can be had; once again, this is an economic dilemma. 
 
Cutting chip corners 
Since the 1980s, the hunt for lower production cost and profit margin maximisation on digital 
equipment has led to a shift of Integrated Circuit foundries, from their birthplace in Silicon Valley to the Far East 
(Perera 2012). This has resulted in most of the big names in IC design becoming 'fabless' producers (as 
producers without fabrication facilities of their own are called) who subcontract the production of their designs 
to independent foundries, mostly in the Far East. According to the Solid State Technology Insights website (SST 
2012), foundries in  Taiwan,  South  Korea,  and  China  occupied  9  of  the  12  top  worldwide  spots  of 
semiconductor foundries for 2012. (The US is still present on the list with two foundries and Israel with one.) 
For China, in particular, according to PwC's report on “China's impact on the semiconductor industry 2013 
update” published in September 2013 (PwC 2013a), China’s semiconductor consumption market grew by 
8.7% in 2012 to reach a new record of 52.5% of the global market, while its share of worldwide electronic 
equipment production increased to 
34.2% in 2012 and is expected to increase to more than 40% by 2017. Accordingly, China’s share of worldwide 
semiconductor production reached 12% in 2012 and is expected to reach at least 14% by 2015. The reliance of 
the world electronics industry on far-eastern semiconductors, a choice made on the grounds of lowering the cost 
of production, appears to have a darker side: for many years there have been rumours that Integrated Circuits 
may contain 'undocumented features' ranging from 'kill switches' to backdoors. One of the first sensational 
stories about a kill switch had to do with the temporary 'blindness' of Syrian radars when Israeli bombers carried 
  
 
out a raid in 2007 against Syrian targets (Adee 2008). Compromised ICs in the radar systems, containing a 'kill 
switch', were blamed at the time and theories about creating hardware backdoors on ICs followed. Recently, 
Skorobogatov and Woods (2012) provided an end to the rumours by actually locating a backdoor on a military 
microchip fabricated by an independent foundry for a fabless IC producer. 
 
Given the proliferation of personal mobile devices and the evolution of 'Internet of Things' which is already well 
under way, the implications of the use of ICs with malicious payload on Cybersecurity are obvious. The risk 
increases as tools like the ‘Shodan’ engine (www.shodanhq.com) which searches for exposed devices on the 
Internet, are becoming available. Unless procedures for secure and authenticated manufacture of ICs as well as 
methods for full post-production verification of ICs are devised (something which at this point proves to be very 
difficult), hundreds of millions of individuals, corporations, and organisations around the world will face 
unprecedented risks. However, the cost for the required procedures and methods will be significant and it 
remains to be seen if the producers of equipment will decide to accept the cost or prefer the creation of new 
vulnerabilities for the sake of the 'bottom line'. 
 
Proposed Controls 
The presented cases only serve as examples of how considerations of an economic nature may directly  or  
indirectly  introduce  vulnerabilities that  undermine the  effort  towards Cybersecurity. One  of  the  obvious 
questions is,  thus, whether effective controls can  be devised. Such controls should both address the risk 
which is linked to the general environment of the current IT market that is beyond the control of any single 
organisation as well as the risk which is induced by decisions made within an organisation's boundaries.As far 
as bad coding is concerned, this could be addressed through compulsory compliance with improved software 
industry standards that enforce secure coding practices such as the ones presented by CERT (2011) and 
OWASP (2010). As the infrastructure for assessing the structural quality of software and non-functional 
requirements, based on code metrics, does exist (e.g. standards ISO/IEC 25010:2011 [ISO 2011] and 9126-
1:2001 [ISO 2001]), it is only a matter of creating mechanisms that ensure code compliance to secure coding 
standards or to improve existing ones (Devanbu & Stubblebine 2000; Chen & Wagner 2002; Baggen, Schill, 
& Visser 2012). A widely-recognised seal of approval could then be given to security- compliant software. 
 
For this idea to bear fruit, it will be necessary for major software houses to be convinced to support it based on 
its long-term merits for the market, rather than to oppose it because of the short-term financial burden that it 
might cause. Such a change in mentality could be assisted by a regulatory framework that rewards secure coding 
practices and inflicts penalties for the lack thereof.A change of mentality might also be in order insofar as users' 
expectations from software are concerned. Instead of using complex and thus security-challenged software, a 
decision should be made to use simpler software without superfluous functionality but with fewer security 
deficiencies. Software should be tuned to an organisation's needs following an accurate requirements' analysis. 
This will not lead to cheaper software but it will help allocate funding more prudently towards increased and 
distributed Cybersecurity. Modular programming could help towards this end, as presented, amongst others, by 
Chen & Wagner (2002), Bauer, Appel, 
& Felten (2003), and Dhiman et al. (2013). 
 
To aid in this direction, markets for vulnerabilities (created by companies that purchase zero- day information on 
  
 
vulnerabilities and then re-sell it exclusively to their clients for a profit), can be used to quantify software 
security, thereby rewarding good programming practices and punishing bad ones as proposed by Anderson & 
Moore (2006).In the above context, if insurance against cyberattacks matures, it will be helpful, through the 
provision of metrics, for quantifying risks induced by poorly-coded and security-challenged software. 
Additionally, accurate evaluation of the cyber-risk levels of organisations will act as an incentive towards better 
Cybersecurity. Organisations will be keener to adopt cyberdefence practices as this will reduce their 
Cybersecurity insurance premiums, leading to a distribution and normalisation of the Cybersecurity effort in a 
manner similar to which vaccinations help eradicate diseases: they work only if, ideally, everybody participates. 
Stricter regulatory compliance should be in place so that when software houses, service providers, or 
infrastructure producers are found to have been negligent concerning the protection  of  the  interests  of  their  
customers/end-users,  or,  worse,  if  they  have  been knowingly working against these interests, the loss 
suffered by the users should be transferred in  part  or  in  whole to  the  offending party. Given the  de-
materialisation of  Information Systems assets, this can only be made possible through the application of 
international law. 
 
In order for correct business choices to be made by taking Cybersecurity issues into consideration during 
business expansion and/or information-related task outsourcing, the following conditions must be met: a) Top-
level Management must work closely with Information Security/Cybersecurity executives and must heed their 
advice in the decision- making process; b) Top-level Management must actively engage in and support the 
creation of a Cybersecurity culture. They should also lead by example and should promote Cybersecurity as a 
core component of the business; c) Information Security/Cybersecurity executives must be involved in and 
have a solid understanding of the business objectives. This is the only way that their expertise can be used 
efficiently for enabling the business. Technical skill alone is not sufficient, and; d) Homogeneous Cybersecurity 
must be applied across the Organisation and its partners in order to avoid weaknesses or 'holes-in-the-wall'.As far 
as cloud technologies are concerned, their further development must include effective Information Security and 
Assurance controls by design. Experience shows that security that comes as an afterthought which is then 
'bolted-on' to an existing product or service, only becomes effective at great difficulty and expense, compared 
to security being incorporated into the product's or service's design from its earlier phases. As cloud services do 
suffer from such a predicament (GIT 2013), a good step towards the normalisation of cloud service security is 
expected to be made by the publication of the announced addition to the ISO/IEC 27000 series of standards. The 
ISO/IEC 27017 standard which is currently under development with an anticipated date of publication towards 
the end of October 2015 (ISO 2014a), is expected to provide the necessary framework for cloud service security 
in line with the ISO/IEC 27002:2013 (ISO 2013). Once again, even if this is not covered in ISO/IEC 27017, an 
appropriate international legal framework will be necessary in resolving and regulating many of the security 
challenges that cloud services currently face. 
 
In order to obtain accurate information on asset valuation which in turn will be used for the proper allocation of 
the information security budget, close cooperation between the business owners of assets, the Information 
Technology actors, and the Information Security and Assurance  executives  is  essential.  Recent  developments, 
such  as  the  publication  of  the ISO/IEC standard 27016:2014 (ISO 2014), which deals in part with the 
organisational economics of Information Security, will eventually provide a rule against which business practices 
can be assessed and improved. Still, if the ISO/IEC 27016:2014 standard is seen merely as a regulatory 
  
 
obligation to conform with, its value will be diminished.Finally, the gravity of the Cybersecurity component in 
the decision-making business process should be stressed. Information Security/Cybersecurity experts cannot be 
management experts and vice-versa. For this reason, security steering committees should be made up of 
experts from all disciplines and Cybersecurity issues should be assigned the importance they deserve and should 
even be given priority over 'bottom-line' financial considerations. To accomplish this, awareness programs must 
be more frequent and their effects be should be monitored. From  the   authors'   experience,  once   decision-
makers  internalise  the   true   gravity  of Cybersecurity issues, they tend to heed the advice of Information 
Security experts more closely. 
 
Inclusion of  Information Security  Economics in  the  Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) Cycle 
Regardless of the effect that controls, based on the suggestions presented in the previous section, may 
have, any organisation should be able to assess at any point in time its own security posture with respect to 
the vulnerabilities stemming -- directly or indirectly -- from financial decisions made within its own boundaries. 
In order to achieve this, the organisation's Information Security Management System (ISMS) will have to be 
adjusted to include such financially-induced vulnerabilities in the scope of the PDCA virtuous cycle. The 
obvious prerequisite for doing so is to identify appropriate indicators that will support the assessment process. 
These indicators do not necessarily have to provide discrete numeric values for the assessment process from the 
first iteration of the process, but should at least a) help identify problem areas in Information Security 
Management that warrant immediate attention, and b) provide a baseline for future iterations in order to 
monitor progress in the areas of concern. The results of iterations following the ones used for defining a 
baseline can be fed to an “Information Security dashboard” that will provide a quick an accurate picture of the 
current state, allowing for iterative steps of adjustment and improvement, as well as possibly highlighting 
emerging problem areas (Frangopoulos, Eloff, & Venter 2014). 
 
Such indicators could include: a) the perceived level of communication between Information 
Security/Cybersecurity executives and Management (as viewed from both sides), b) the pervasiveness of new 
and possibly security-wise immature technologies in business processes, c) the gravity of Information 
Security/Cybersecurity considerations against financial ones in the business decision-making process (as 
perceived by both the Information Security/ Cybersecurity and Management groups), d) the level of adherence 
to legacy Information Technology projects and solutions that do not have properly built-in security controls, e) 
the level of involvement of Information Security/Cybersecurity executives in the business decision-making 
process (as perceived from both the Information Security/Cybersecurity executives and Management), and f) the 
level of business and information handling processes conformity to Information Security standards.The above list 
of indicators is definitely not exhaustive. As it is generally true for proper indicator selection, this list must 
be augmented and adapted to the specific needs of each organisation, always bearing in mind the goal of this 
exercise, which is none other than to look behind the obvious for Information Security/Cybersecurity 





Conclusions and Further Work 
A non-exhaustive list of representative examples of economic considerations that lead to IS vulnerabilities has 
been examined. Controls for vulnerabilities directly or indirectly caused by economic considerations are of a 
financial nature themselves and where that is not effective, institutional compliance must come into play. New 
technologies should be allowed to mature and pass through the crucible of time before being used in IS-critical 
situations. Technologies used for inconsequential communication and data management should not be ported to 
an IS- critical environment. Software houses may have to be institutionally forced to be more honest in their 
marketing habits and their customers must learn to exercise self-restraint and not to be gluttonous in their IT-
related desires. Users and, most importantly, decision-makers must be re-educated on the value of privacy and 
security in cyberspace and the collective awareness level on IS and Cybersecurity must be raised. By 
systematically introducing economic considerations as vulnerability inducers in the Information 
Security/Cybersecurity posture assessment process, an 'Information Security dashboard'  for  financially-induced 
vulnerabilities can  be  created. For  such  a  monitoring system to be effective, appropriate indicators must be 
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